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Egoism and altruism are unequal contenders in the explanation of human
behaviour. While egoism tends to be viewed as natural and unproblematic,
altruism has always been treated with suspicion, and it has often been
argued that apparent cases of altruistic behaviour might really just be some
special form of egoism. The reason for this is that egoism fits into our usual
theoretical views of human behaviour in a way that altruism does not.
This is true on the biological level, where an evolutionary account seems
to favour egoism, as well as on the psychological level, where an account
of self-interested motivation is deeply rooted in folk psychology and in the
economic model of human behaviour. While altruism has started to receive
increasing support in both biological and psychological debates over the last
decades, this paper focuses on yet another level, where egoism is still widely
taken for granted. Philosophical egoism (Martin Hollis’ term) is the view that,
on the ultimate level of intentional explanation, all action is motivated by
one of the agent’s desires. This view is supported by the standard notion that
for a complex of behaviour to be an action, there has to be a way to account
for that behaviour in terms of the agent’s own pro-attitudes. Psychological
altruists, it is claimed, are philosophical egoists in that they are motivated
by desires that have the other’s benefit rather than the agent’s own for its
ultimate object (other-directed desires). This paper casts doubt on this thesis,
arguing that empathetic agents act on other people’s pro-attitudes in very
much the same way as agents usually act on their own, and that while other-
directed desires do play an important role in many cases of psychologically
altruistic action, they are not necessary in explanations of some of the most
basic and most pervasive types of human altruistic behaviour. The paper
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concludes with the claim that philosophical egoism is really a cultural value
rather than a conceptual feature of action.
1. EGOISM: BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
In English, just as in most other European languages, the word ‘egoism’
had already been in use for quite some time before Auguste Comte
introduced its antonym into western thought. Ever since its invention,
the term ‘altruism’ has had a hard time finding a place in explanations
of human behaviour. There is a sense in which egoism seems natural
and unproblematic in a way that altruism does not. Even Comte himself,
one of the most ardent advocates of his terminological offspring, had to
admit that egoism is genetically secondary, motivationally more stable
and structurally less demanding than altruism (e.g. Comte 1851: 693f).
A great number of thinkers have gone further in claiming that apparent
cases of altruistic behaviour are really just some more sophisticated
version of egoism. The reason for this is that given our theories about
human behaviour, egoism has an obvious explanatory advantage over
altruism. This is true both on the biological and the psychological level
of the debate. In an evolutionary account of the biological world, any
‘self’ (be it a group, an individual, or a gene) is selected for its capacity
to maximize its own reproductive fitness. This makes biological altruism
seem a hopelessly self-defeating strategy: maximizing the reproductive
fitness of others at the cost of their own, biologically altruistic selves would
soon disappear from the scene of the Darwinian struggle for survival. On
the psychological level, where the focus is on motivation rather than on
fitness effects, a similar picture emerges. Psychological egoism is the claim
that people act only in their perceived self-interest, a notion that receives
strong support from our standard view of human motivation, according
to which people basically seek to maximize their own expected utility.1
This makes psychological altruism seem highly problematic: if an agent
acts in the interest of another person at costs to herself, the question arises
of why she did it, and it is often claimed that she must have expected to
get something out of the deal for herself after all, be it in the form of the
infamous ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni 1990), some sympathetic satisfaction
(Becker 1986) or simply in avoiding the negative arousal (e.g. pricks of
conscience) she expects to experience were she to act differently.
1 Psychological egoism is to be distinguished from biological egoism because people’s self-
interests may differ considerably from their reproductive fitness. To use Ernst Fehr’s
example (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003): smoking a cigarette is psychologically egoistic in
that it (myopically) optimizes the agent’s well-being, while it is biologically altruistic since
it decreases the agent’s reproductive fitness and contributes to that of other agents by
eliminating one competitor for resources from the scene.
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In spite of the explanatory advantage of egoism, altruism has started
to receive increasing support on both the biological and psychological
level in the last few decades. On the biological level, kin selection
theories (Trivers 1971) have shown how the altruistic behaviour of one
individual towards her kin might increase the reproductive fitness of
her genes; a complex of behaviour that is altruistic from the point of
view of the individual appears as compatible with the ‘selfish gene’-view
of evolution. Going one step further, group selection theory (Sober and
Wilson 1998) argues that groups may be seen as separate units of selection,
and that under some (very specific) circumstances altruistic behaviour
even among non-kin is evolutionarily stable in that it increases the group’s
fitness. On the psychological level, Dan Batson has gone at great length
showing that ‘pure altruism’ (i.e. actions whose ultimate goal is the benefit
of others) is empirically plausible (e.g. Batson 1991); Eliot Sober and David
Sloan Wilson (1998) have argued forcefully that while the existence of
psychological altruism might turn out to be impossible to prove, it is an
evolutionarily plausible hypothesis.2
In all of these interpretations, as well as in Philip Kitcher’s important
work on the topic (e.g. Kitcher 1998), psychological altruism appears
as a special mode of motivation. Psychological altruists do not seek to
improve their own well-being, however broadly conceived, but act on
desires whose ultimate goal is to promote other people’s well-being,
independently of whether or not they get anything out of the deal for
themselves. In other words, the agent herself does not figure in the content
of the desire by which the psychologically altruistic action is motivated.
Using Philip Kitcher’s term, one may call these other-directed desires.
This paper addresses a further level of the debate on which egoism
is still widely taken for granted. I am concerned with a sense in which
even psychologically altruistic action, insofar as it is motivated by other-
directed desires, might still be called egoistic in that it is her own desire
on which the psychological altruist acts, and not her beneficiary’s. Even
though the promotion of the beneficiary’s interests, desires, or well-being
rather than her own will figure in the content of the desire in question,
the psychological altruist promotes her beneficiary’s interests only insofar
(and to the degree to which) she herself wishes to do so. However
non-selfish her interests may be, the motivational agenda behind her
behaviour is still her own. In order to direct his reader’s attention to
this notoriously elusive feature and to distinguish it from psychological
2 In Sober’s and Wilson’s example: a parent with the capacity to care for her children, even
in the hopefully rare cases in which she happens not to feel like it at all, might be more
efficient than the one who is only motivated by her parental inclinations; psychological
altruism appears as a back-up system for the case of the breakdown of the regular
psychologically egoistic operating mode.
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egoism, Martin Hollis introduces the label ‘philosophical egoism’, which
seems appropriate because the issue at stake here is not a question
concerning the kind of motivation, but rather a question of its conceptual
structure, which falls firmly into the domain of philosophy:
Even if there is no psychological egoism, there is still prone to be a
philosophical egoism in all accounts of what moves human agents. It
surfaces when we ask how exactly a preference for x over y, or a calculation
that x offers more utility than y, moves someone to act. In so far as
preferences are a newer name for what used to be called passions, the classic
answer is that the agent expects to gain greater psychological satisfaction.
Since not all sources of satisfaction are self-centered, there is room for many
desires and many ways to satisfy them. If ‘self-interest’ is construed in this
broader sense, we can still hold that ‘every agent is actuated solely by self-
interest’. But what is then meant is that all action comes about as the stock
desire/belief model suggests, by the prompting of desire, tempered by the
agent’s beliefs about alternative ways to satisfy it. Crucially, Adam is moved
solely by what Adam wants and Eve solely by what Eve wants. Call this
philosophical egoism. (Hollis 1998: 20f)
Aside from the label, the distinction between psychological and
philosophical egoism as such is not Hollis’ invention. Already in a paper
from 1958, Joel Feinberg had shown that no convincing conception of
‘desire’ allows us to derive psychological egoism from the assumption
that actions are motivated in the agent’s own desires (Feinberg
1958/1995). However, since Feinberg’s aim was limited to defending
psychological altruism, he used this argument only to prove that it
is wrong to stick to psychological egoism from fear of having to
reject philosophical egoism, as often seems to occur, and that there
is a way of conceiving of psychological altruism which is compatible
with philosophical egoism. In his paper, Feinberg does not question
philosophical egoism. He simply points out that philosophical egoists are
psychological altruists to the degree that their desires are other-directed,
thereby affirming the limited conception of psychological altruism still
accepted in the current debate.
In the following, I will not take issue with Feinberg’s fundamental
insight, which I take for granted. The aim of this paper is to challenge
philosophical egoism on its own terms, i.e. as a kind of egoism that
must be distinguished from psychological egoism, and this will allow
me to sidestep the confusion that Feinberg has already so thoroughly
cleared up. I shall challenge philosophical egoism as a general theory
about the structure of human action, and argue for the possibility of
philosophical altruism, i.e. action which is not motivated by the altruist’s
own other-directed desires, but by the volitive or conative attitudes of
others. This is no easy task, as the theory behind philosophical egoism
seems to be even more formidable than the theories behind biological
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and psychological egoism. On the philosophical level, the objection to be
met is not an empirical claim about the development of the biological
world, or some folk-psychological assumption about human motivation
but rather a purely philosophical, conceptual point about the very nature
of action. Biological altruism may seem highly improbable in the light of
evolution theory, and psychological altruism appears as rather implausible
in the light of the standard view of human motivation; the idea of
philosophical altruism, however, is faced with the objection that it is
simply an inconsistent idea and, as a matter of pure conceptual necessity,
impossible. The reason is this: it seems plausible to say that for a complex
of behaviour to be an action, there has to be a description under which
the agent wanted to do it; according to mainstream action theory, actions
are identified by the pro-attitudes (Donald Davidson’s term) of the agent for
whom they act as a motivation. This makes philosophical egoism appear
as a structural feature of any action, however altruistic it may be. The basic
argument that I shall develop in this paper in order to meet this objection
is that this view is not so much mistaken as it is imprecise. My argument
relies on the distinction between intentions and desires, the two of which
are usually lumped together under the Davidsonian label ‘pro-attitude’.
While an intention needs to be the agent’s own, the motivating desire
does not, or so I shall argue. This leaves ample space for philosophical
altruism: philosophical altruists act intentionally on other people’s desires
or intentions, but the reason for their doing so is not to be found in some
other-directed desire, but rather in the other’s volitive or conative states of
which altruists are empathetically aware. Empathy plays the exact same
structural role in philosophically altruistic action as the agent’s awareness
of her own desires does in philosophically egoistic cases, but extends the
class of possible motivating reasons for action beyond her own ‘subjective
motivational set’.
I shall proceed as follows. First, I will dispel the idea that philoso-
phical altruism is simply a confused notion that appears reasonable only
to philosophically untrained minds (as it is sometimes claimed in the
received literature) by introducing three philosophers who have argued
for the possibility of philosophical altruism. Looking at their views will
also help us to get a closer grip on why almost all philosophers (including
some of those discussed) ultimately shy away from this notion and resort
to other-directed desires explanations (‘the paradox of philosophical
altruism’). In the next section, I shall try to establish the fact that, in
spite of these conceptual worries, there is some intuitive plausibility to
the idea of philosophical altruism. For this purpose, I shall suggest a
fundamental shift of focus in the debate. The paradigm cases of altruistic
behaviour discussed in the received literature include examples such as
donating to charities, acting as a Good Samaritan, or sacrificing one’s life
for others. I propose to shift away from such heroism and consider instead
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spontaneous small-scale, low-cost, cooperative everyday behaviour, such
as holding the door open for other people or moving aside to make room
for another person on a park bench, both of which might seem merely
to be routine acts of politeness rather than cases of proper altruism. I
shall argue that many such acts are genuinely altruistic rather than norm-
guided routines, and that in many of these cases, philosophical altruism
seems intuitively more plausible than other-directed desires explanations.
In Section 4, I will turn from articulating intuitions to revisiting the
conceptual problem encountered in Section 2. I will argue that the
paradox can be resolved, and that philosophical altruism is compatible
with our standard conception of action, once it is understood correctly.
My argument relies on the distinction between what I propose to call
‘intentional autonomy’ and ‘motivational autarky’. Section 5 analyses the
role of empathy and interpersonal identification. The concluding Section
6 addresses the question of the true nature of philosophical egoism. My
claim will be that philosophical egoism is really a deep-seated cultural
ideal rather than a conceptual feature of action. Acting exclusively on
one’s own motivating desires is part and parcel of our idea of a fully
developed and self-dependent person, and this in turn is compatible
with the fact that, very often, actual agents do not conform to this
ideal.
2. THE PARADOX OF PHILOSOPHICAL ALTRUISM
Philosophical altruism is rarely taken seriously in the current literature.
In those few cases in which the issue comes up, it is usually treated as a
mere conceptual scam or the result of philosophical confusion. Thus Sober
and Wilson (1998: 223) argue that it is simply a mistake to define egoism
in terms of ‘being motivated by one’s own desires’, and that this results
in a ‘spurious’ and ‘short-circuited’ view of altruism. The undertones of
Philip Kitcher’s remarks on the topic seem even harsher. Kitcher appears
to think that only non-philosophers could be so naïve as to think that
there is more to the problem than mere conceptual confusion; he calls the
idea of philosophical altruism a ‘mistake’ which, in a somewhat opaque
dialectical move, he deems ‘illuminating’ because it ‘distorts a genuine
insight’ (Kitcher 1998: 291). The genuine insight at stake is basically
Feinberg’s (1958/1995): it is that not all desires are self-directed. For
Kitcher, just as for Sober and Wilson, it is clear that altruists, just like any
other agents, are motivated by their own desires, although their desires
are other-directed rather than selfish. According to these authors, just as
for many others, the question of egoism and altruism is not a question
of the ‘owner’ of the motivating desire, but rather a question of whether
the agent himself or another person figures in its content. Yet the notion
of philosophical altruism – if not the term – is neither new nor simply a
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product of confusions occurring in philosophically untrained minds only.
There have been some philosophers who have, to some degree at least,
argued for this concept, and looking at some of their views might be a
good point to start. I have selected three examples.
Arthur Schopenhauer may seem a problematic example, as he en-
dorsed a narrow conception of motivation with hedonistic underpinnings
that exclude the kind of psychological altruism at the centre of the
current debate. Thus one might suspect Schopenhauer’s endorsement of
philosophical altruism to be a result of the fallacy identified by Feinberg.
However, even if Schopenhauer was mistaken in excluding ‘classical’
psychological altruism, it seems wrong to presume that he might not have
been onto something important in his account of philosophical altruism.
Here is the crux of his argument in On the Basis of Morality (1840/1995):
The only motive of the will, Schopenhauer claims, is either pleasure or
suffering. Action is egoistic to the degree that the agent’s will is moved
by her own pleasure or suffering. Egoistic action is either morally neutral
or unethical. Moral action requires altruism (though the term is not used
by Schopenhauer). Action is altruistic to the degree that the beneficiary’s
pleasure or suffering is the altruist’s immediate motive in the exact same
way her will is moved by her own pleasure and suffering in all other
actions. Thus the basic problem for an account of altruistic action, in
Schopenhauer’s view, is to show how another person’s psychological
states can directly motivate the altruist’s action without any extra motive
of hers interfering in the process. Schopenhauer does claim that this is in
fact possible, and that compassion provides the answer to this question.
But he also freely admits that ‘this process is most puzzling, and indeed
mysterious’, as it blurs the distinction between persons (Schopenhauer
1840/1995, §16).
A second example is to be found in Thomas Nagel’s Possibility of
Altruism (1970), where Nagel claims that ‘an appeal to our interests,
or sentiments, to account for altruism, is superfluous. (. . .) There is, in
other words, such a thing as pure altruism (though it may never occur
in isolation from all other motives). It is the direct influence of one
person’s interest on the actions of another’ (1970: 80). Nagel does not
speak of desires, but rather of interests; but it is clear from the context
that he is concerned here with motivational states. This is clear from the
following passage, in which he anticipates a worry his critics may have
concerning his previous claim: ‘since it is I who am acting, even when
I act in the interest of another, it must be an interest of mine which
provides the impulse. If so, any convincing justification of apparently
altruistic behaviour must appeal to what I want’. Nagel does not grant
this objection. But, as he adopts a Kantian view of practical reason, he
also does not provide a straightforward answer as to how other people’s
interests may prompt an altruist’s action directly, and he even follows Kant
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in his rebuke of compassion-based accounts of altruism. Yet still, the claim
stands: as far as the motivational input for altruistic actions is concerned,
the altruist’s own psychology may be the wrong place to look; any appeal
to an altruist’s own motivational agenda might simply be superfluous,
and the other person’s interests might just be enough.
My last example is Amartya K. Sen’s notion of ‘committed action’.
As early as his ‘Rational fools’ (1977), Sen argues explicitly against the
view that committed actions can be accommodated within a preference-
based framework simply by widening the scope of the agent’s preferences.
Committed action, he claims, involves ‘counter-preferential choice’,
suggesting a behaviour that cannot be explained by the agent’s own
preferences, however widely they are conceived. In ‘Goals, commitment,
and identity’ (1985/2002), Sen casts this claim in terms of goals rather than
preferences; however, as goals can be seen as the conditions of satisfaction
of desires, his considerations are directly pertinent to the question at issue
here. Sen argues in this paper that it is a mistake to assume that ‘a person’s
choices must be based on the pursuit of her own goals’. Committed agents,
he suggests, may act directly on other people’s goals, without making
them their own. Sen points out that one person’s identifying herself with
another might play a role here, but he, too, clearly articulates the worries
he expects his critics to have: ‘It might appear that if I were to pursue
anything other than what I see as my own goals, then I am suffering
from an illusion; these other things are my goals, contrary to what I might
believe’ (1985/2002: 212).
Thus even a cursory look into the literature reveals that contrary to
what Sober, Wilson and Kitcher seem to think, the idea of philosophical
altruism has crossed many philosophically acute minds.3 But it is equally
clear that neither Nagel nor Sen offers a straightforward conception of
philosophically altruistic action, limiting themselves instead to the view
that there is something wrong with philosophical egoism. Schopenhauer,
by contrast, does elaborate on his view in some of his other writings, but
since his ultimate metaphysical conclusion is that the difference between
persons is only a matter of appearance and that ‘in ourselves’ we are really
one and the same (cf. Schopenhauer 1849: 625), such an elaboration may not
lend his notion of non-selfish behaviour additional plausibility – at least as
an account of altruistic action (to the same degree that we are really one at
some deeper metaphysical level, all action, be it motivated by one’s own
desires or by another’s, is ultimately selfish).
Clearly, the problem with the notion of philosophical altruism is not
empirical, but conceptual. In the chapter on Egoism and Altruism in
his Introduction to the Sciences of Ethics (1892), Georg Simmel gives one
3 Another clear and well-argued example is Paprzycka (2002).
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of the clearest (if somewhat idealistic) statements of why the idea of
philosophical altruism might be mistaken a priori:
Just as all objects of possible consideration are only in my imagination, since
I cannot outrun my ego in my thoughts, I could never do it in practice either.
All imagining is my imagining, and likewise, all willing is my willing, and
I could not possibly pursue anything but my own goals. Just as, according
to the Kantian conception, the things in themselves do not enter my mind,
the interests of other people cannot determine my will in action. Real
objects exist for me only if they become subjective and thus present in my
imagination. In the same way, other people and their interest are relevant
to me only when mediated through my own interests. Only by making
another person’s interests my own can my will acquire any altruistic content.
(Simmel 1892, Vol. 1, Ch. 2)
In the terminology of present-day action theory, Simmel’s intuition can
be cast more sharply and without idealistic overtones. One basic role of
motivational states is that they rationalize action; they are the reasons that
distinguish actions from other kinds of events that have only causes. By
identifying actions, reasons for action (which split into beliefs and desires)
also identify the agent. In Donald Davidson’s words: ‘R is a primary reason
why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if R
consists of a pro attitude of the agent toward actions with a certain property,
and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property’
(Davidson 1963: 687; my emphasis). Thus it seems that philosophically
altruistic action is a simple contradiction in terms. If the altruist is to be
the agent of her own behaviour, the primary reasons for that behaviour
have to be hers. Thus her behaviour cannot be philosophically altruistic.
(Remember that ex hypothesi such behaviour is not to be rationalized by the
altruist’s own pro-attitudes, but rather by the beneficiary’s; therefore, the
altruist’s behaviour would not instantiate her own actions, but rather
the beneficiary’s.) An altruist’s behaviour can be either her own action,
or it can be philosophically altruistic, but it cannot be both. Since it
is plausible to assume that an altruist’s behaviour does instantiate her
own actions (the metaphor ‘lending a hand’ should not be considered
more than just that: a metaphor), it follows that there is no philosophical
altruism. Philosophers like Schopenhauer, Nagel and Sen were simply
on the wrong track in the passages quoted above. There might be
psychological altruism, in terms of actions based on other-directed desires,
but philosophically, we’re all really egoists – or so it seems.
3. EVERYDAY ALTRUISM
Having addressed the conceptual problem with philosophical altruism, I
will now try to show that, in spite of these philosophical worries, there
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is a great deal of plausibility to philosophical altruism at the intuitive
level. In order to do so, I recommend a shift of focus concerning the
kind of phenomena taken into consideration. In the received literature
on altruism, the paradigm cases are donating to charities, helping Jews
in Nazi Germany, acting as a Good Samaritan, or the famous WWI
Lieutenant throwing himself onto the grenade that has fallen into his
trench in order to protect his comrades. By contrast to such heroism, the
kind of behaviour analysed in this paper is of a much less spectacular
kind. As our paradigm case, I choose the following example. In a session
of the Economic Science Association at the ASSA-meeting in Chicago early
in 2007, the economist and behavioural scientist Herbert Gintis opened
his talk on altruism with a simple case of everyday behaviour that he
had just witnessed. Standing with his suitcases before closed doors in
front of the conference building and unable to find the open-door button,
some passer-by who observed the scene had taken it upon herself to press
the button for him, leaving the scene immediately after having helped
without even waiting to be thanked. Perhaps Gintis is right and more
attention should be devoted to behaviour of this kind in the debate on
altruism. Such behaviour is pervasive in social life; it certainly does occur
in intimate relationships, too, but its special status becomes even more
visible in the anonymity of the public domain: people holding doors open
for strangers carrying suitcases, passengers helping each other to lift baby
carriages into and out of trains, people moving aside on their benches
so that other people can sit down too; commuters on railway platforms
facilitating other people’s passage by moving out of their way; passengers
assisting each other lifting their suitcases to and from carry-on luggage
trays, people picking up objects for other people.
Such behaviour is considerably different from the kinds of examples
usually encountered in the literature. At least three distinctive features
are immediately apparent. First, it is essential to the paradigmatic cases of
altruism found in the received literature that the altruists incur some cost
(be it time, effort, money, or, in the extreme case, one’s own life). Some
degree of self-sacrifice is usually taken to be essential for an action to be
altruistic. By contrast, our examples seem to be marked by indifference.
It is true that, in actual fact, the benefactors do incur some costs, but
they are minimal and they seem to play no role in the benefactor’s own
perception of the situation. Where the stakes are high, such behaviour
usually disappears; it might be difficult to find a person ready to hold
a door open for another passenger when she knows that she may miss
her train as a result. Such behaviour occurs in low-cost situations only,
or so it seems. Second, such acts seem to be, to a large degree, non-
premeditated. These benefactors act more or less spontaneously and perhaps
even unthinkingly, following well-established routines in their everyday
lives. This is very different from cases such as the donor’s, where some
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conscious deliberative process of weighing one’s own interests against the
beneficiary’s seems to be essential. Third, there is a fundamental difference
in the kind of attitude at work between the benefactor and her beneficiary;
the view of other underlying such behaviour is superficial. Classical acts of
altruism are marked by some sort of care or concern for the beneficiaries.
This entails that the benefactor has some conception of the beneficiary’s
needs, which in vicarious or patronizing forms of altruistic action might
differ from the beneficiary’s own, as well as from his manifest desires
and intentions. As opposed to this, the behaviour of the above agents is
not guided by an understanding of any of the beneficiary’s deeper needs,
but rests entirely at the level of their immediate and manifest goals. These
benefactors support their beneficiaries in whatever they seem to be trying
to do, and this does not involve any further evaluation of these goals,
which seems to make these cases a matter of manner rather than of morals.
In short, the phenomenon is this: other-directed, spontaneous, routine-
like and apparently non-deliberative action in which other people are
supported in the pursuit of their immediate goals in low-cost situations.
In what follows, I shall call such behaviour everyday altruism.
Looking at these differences, one might doubt whether or not such
behaviour should be taken as cases of altruism. Especially philosophers
working on ethics tend to have rather high expectations for altruistic
behaviour, demanding some sort of concern addressing the deeper needs
of the other rather than just a tendency to spontaneous cooperation, and
some degree of self-sacrifice rather than just minimal cost assistance.
Be that as it may, it seems clear that such behaviour does nicely fit
the phenomena Auguste Comte had in mind when he coined the term,
and experimental economists, who have now started to claim the label
for themselves, will have no difficulty accepting this classification (cf.
Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). After all, the behaviour in question does
benefit another person, and it does come at a cost to the benefactor,
however minimal it might be. The question is: why do people behave
this way, especially where the type and the anonymity of the situation
seems to exclude reputation effects and sanctioning? The standard
account of human motivation recommends looking for psychological
rewards or costs, and indeed the effects of grateful smiles should not be
underestimated; but in many cases (such as in Gintis’), everyday altruists
do not even wait around to be thanked. As far as psychological costs are
concerned, it is certainly true that we are creatures with a tremendous
capacity for internal negative sanctioning (imagine the pang of shame you
feel when you realize that you’ve been observed picking your nose even
by a complete stranger), but as far as everyday altruism is concerned, no
such taboo seems to be involved: sometimes people do it, very often they
do not, and neither warm glow nor pangs of shame seem to account for
the difference.
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As far as the question of motivation is concerned, it is usually good
advice to ask the agents. This is not to say that agents are always
truthful concerning their motivation, and especially if one is partial to
psychoanalysis, one might even allow for cases in which the agents
are simply incompetent concerning the question of their own ultimate
motives. Also, there might be a difference in terminology; philosophers
sometimes use terms such as ‘desire’ simply for behavioural dispositions
rather than for some internal psychological entity. But as far as normal,
non-pathological cases of action and standard usages of motivational
vocabulary are concerned, it seems that the agents themselves are in a
privileged position. So it might be worth thinking about the kinds of
answers everyday altruists might come up with when asked about their
motivation.
As far as standard cases of altruistic actions are concerned, such
research has already been carried out by social psychologists. When
‘classical’ altruists who have donated to charity or done volunteer work
were asked why they did so, they usually answered that they ‘wanted to
do something useful’ or that they ‘wanted to do good deeds for others’,
or something along these lines (Reddy 1980 quoted in Sober and Wilson
1998: 252). Such self-reports are, of course, in perfect tune with classical
accounts of psychological altruism: the ultimate goals that these people
cite are other-directed, as the agents themselves do not figure in the
content of their motivation. On the philosophical level, such motivations
are clearly egoistic: the desires cited by these altruists are their own desires.
What motivated their action was what they wanted, which corresponds
to the view of philosophical egoism that the only motivational base for
action is self-interest, if self-interest is taken in the purely formal sense of
ownership rather than content, i.e. in the sense that the interest at stake
is the agent’s own rather than anybody else’s (remember Martin Hollis’
definition of philosophical egoism in the first section above). To adherents
of standard action theory, this result will come as no surprise, because for
them this is simply a matter of conceptual necessity and so not up for
empirical falsification. However, there seems to be a way in which cases
of everyday altruism can be explained in ordinary language that does not
fit so well with philosophical egoism. I do not know if any such work has
been carried out in social psychology, so I will have to rely on intuitions
about ordinary language which I can only hope the reader also shares.
Imagine asking Herbert Gintis’ helper why she pushed the open-
door button for him. It is quite possible, of course, that she would say
that she wanted to render that man a service, or that she simply wanted
to be polite, or that she simply couldn’t bear the sight of the man’s
helplessness, thereby citing some other-directed desire of her own. But
there is something slightly artificial about such explanations. It seems
much more plausible that her answer to the question would simply be:
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‘Because he [Gintis] couldn’t find it.’ Similarly, if one asked a person on
the park bench for what reason she had moved aside when another person
approached the bench, she would probably say ‘because that person
wanted to sit down, too’ rather than ‘because I wanted to make space
for him to sit down beside me’, or ‘because I wanted to be nice to him’
or something of that sort. The decisive difference is this: in explaining the
behaviour in question, these reports cite other people’s pro-attitudes rather
than the agent’s own. As opposed to donors, volunteer workers, or other
classical altruists, everyday altruists seem more likely to explain their
behaviour in terms of what other people want rather than in terms of
their own desires. Insofar as this is true, the possibility arises that
philosophical altruism might not after all be nothing more than a confused
philosophical idea in the minds of such authors as Arthur Schopenhauer,
Thomas Nagel and Amartya Sen; it may also be part of the everyday
altruist’s own self-understanding, thus adding further weight to the idea.
However, even if this intuition concerning ordinary linguistic
practices is accepted as plausible, there are still alternative interpretations
to consider. One way to make such manners of speaking compatible
with philosophical egoism relies on the difference between motivation
and justification. When they explain their behaviour in terms of the
pro-attitudes of other people rather than their own, one might think
that everyday altruists are pointing out those reasons in the light of
which their actions are justified rather than saying anything about the
motivating reasons for those actions. The distinction between justifying
and motivating reasons (cf. Pettit and Smith 2004: 270) is fundamental
insofar as agents might be motivated by reasons which they do not take
to be justified, such as the case of the unwilling addict who acts on his
desire to take the drug without taking the satisfaction of his desire to
be a goal worthwhile pursuing. Such behaviour is rationalized by the
motivating desire without being fully rational for lack of a justifying
reason. In normal cases of action, however, justification and motivation
do not come apart entirely. In the Kantian view, it is because she sees it as
worth doing that a rational agent’s will is moved to perform an action.
In the Humean view, some further motivation is assumed, such as the
desire to do the right thing. Thus the objection to the view that the above
ordinary language examples express philosophical altruism is that these
everyday altruists only refer to justifying reasons while remaining silent
about their motivational structure, which they simply take for granted
(everyday altruists do not deem it necessary to point out that they are
motivated to do the right thing). The other’s intention or desire did not
motivate their helping behaviour; rather, it was the reason in the light of
which they were justified in wanting to intervene.
In order to assess the strength of this alternative view, we need to
alter the situation so as to make sure that the explanation given by an
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everyday altruist is focused on motivation rather than justification. The
following modification was suggested to me.4 Consider again Herbert
Gintis standing in front of the closed door with his helper approaching
the scene. But now suppose that there is another person, the helper’s
colleague, whom the helper knows to be familiar with the opening
mechanism, and who is closer to the button than the helper herself. The
helper sees that her colleague is aware of the fact that Gintis cannot find
the button. But the colleague doesn’t seem to bother, so the helper steps in
and pushes the button herself. What would she say now, were she asked
why she did so?
Before considering possible replies, a word on how this modification
helps us to focus on motivation rather than justification is in order.
According to the contrastive nature of any explanation (Garfinkel 1981:
Ch. 1), the question ‘why did you push the button’, as asked of the helper,
acquires a different meaning in these altered circumstances. Now, the
question is not so much ‘why did you push the button rather than doing
nothing’, but ‘why did you rather than your colleague push the button?’
This change in the background of the question moves the focus from
justification to motivation, because as far as justification is concerned,
both the helper and his colleague are in the same position: both had
equal justifying reason to intervene. Therefore, pointing out the justifying
reason would do nothing to explain the difference in their behaviour. Thus
it seems that, in this situation, the helper’s reply will finally be a clear
indication of whether or not she sees herself as a philosophical egoist:
the reasons she quotes will be her motivating reasons. If she sees herself
as a philosophical egoist, her reply to the question would have to be
something along the lines of ‘I pressed the button because I wanted to
help/wanted to be polite (while my colleague did not seem to have any
such desire).’ It does not seem, however, that such a reply would have to
be given. It seems at least equally natural to expect an answer like ‘because
he [Gintis] wanted to enter the building and my colleague didn’t bother
to help him.’ Again, this explanation does not cite the altruist’s own pro-
attitudes, but rather someone else’s. As far as this is convincing, it seems
that ordinary language and folk psychology do not unequivocally support
philosophical egoism. It remains a remarkable fact about everyday life
that, where motivation is concerned, people often explain their behaviour
in terms of other people’s pro-attitudes rather than in terms of their own,
frustrating, to some degree at least, the attempt to make sense of their
behaviour in terms of their own psychology. Thus it might be worthwhile
taking a closer look at the paradox of philosophical altruism. Is there
a way to fit philosophical altruism into a reasonable account of action,
4 This example is courtesy of an anonymous referee for Economics & Philosophy.
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absolving such cases of charges of sloppy talk, mere self-deceptions, or
false consciousness?
4. THE PARADOX RESOLVED
As noted above in Section 2, the difficulty is a conceptual one. For a
complex of behaviour to be an action, there has to be a description
under which the agent wanted to do it. This is to say, there has to be a
way to make sense of the behaviour in question in terms of the agent’s
own pro-attitudes. Once more, Feinberg’s fundamental insight should be
remembered: the claim at stake here is neither that people are autistic
and act in complete disregard of other people’s wishes (people do take
other people’s wishes into account in the pursuit of their actions), nor is it
that people act only in the pursuit of their own selfish goals (people may
well be psychological altruists and act on nothing but their own desire to
fulfil another person’s wish, without wanting to get anything out of the
deal for themselves). The egoism in question here is not psychological,
but philosophical; philosophical egoism seems to be built into our
very notion of action. Were a subject to act directly and exclusively on
another person’s pro-attitude, i.e. without having any volitional agenda
of her own, her behaviour would be rationalizable only in terms of that
other person’s pro-attitude and would thus be this other person’s action
rather than the subject’s own. One might call such a hypothetical subject
an intentional zombie: her behaviour would instantiate entirely another
person’s agency; she would be behaving entirely on that other person’s
strings. Intentional zombie-ism often occurs in sci-fi novels and in the self-
reports of schizophrenics. It is not, however, a feature of everyday life, and
certainly not present in the cases of everyday altruism mentioned above.
The behaviour of everyday altruists does instantiate their own actions.
But how, then, could it possibly be philosophically altruistic? The solution
I propose hinges on the distinction between intention and desire. There is
a sense in which everyday altruists do what they want and because they
want to, but this ‘wanting’ should be understood in conative rather than
motivational terms.
Were one to ask Herbert Gintis’ helper whether she had wanted
to push the open door button (rather than acting, in a Manchurian-
Candidate-like way, on Gintis’ strings), her reply would surely be positive.
But the term ‘wanting’ is notoriously ambiguous, oscillating between
‘aiming at’ and ‘being motivated to’. Labels such as Davidson’s ‘pro-
attitudes’ or Bernard Williams’ (1981) ‘subjective motivational set’ lump
together a person’s motivational states (such as inclinations, urges, and
desires) and her practical commitments (intentions, plans, and projects).
At this point, it is important to take a closer look at the relation
between the volitive and the conative elements of an agent’s ‘subjective
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motivational set’. How are desires and intentions related? The received
literature distinguishes two types of relation. The first, constitutive
account ties intentions closely to desires; desires are constitutive of
intentions in that they are the volitional component by which an agent
cannot intend to A without wanting to A.5 This constitutive reading
of the relation between intention and desire, in which desire is really
a conceptual component of intention, has to be distinguished from a
motivational reading, in which desire and intention are related in rational
and perhaps causal terms rather than in constitutive terms. In this
motivational sense, desires are the rational base on which intentions are
formed. The fact that a person is thirsty is the reason why she intends to
have a drink. Here, the desire logically precedes the intention and provides
the motivating reason for which an intention is formed. Thus there is a
further ambiguity to be cleared up in the assumption that for a complex
of behaviour to be an action, a linguistically competent agent has to be
able to come up with a description under which she wanted to do what
she did. This assumption is unproblematic insofar as it means that she
has to be able to cite some ‘constitutive desire’, which really amounts to
nothing more than pointing out the intention; it is not unproblematic at
all, however, if it is taken to mean that she has to be able to cite some
motivating desire of her own.
When Gintis’ helper says – as she certainly would, were she asked –
that she wanted to do what she did (after all, she was not forced to do
so by Gintis’ telekinetic powers), she clearly refers to a conative attitude.
What she means is that she did what she did on purpose, i.e. intentionally
(rather than behaving in a way beyond her control). This does not conflict
with her claim that, as far as her motivation is concerned, the reason for
her action is not to be found in her own ‘subjective motivational set’, but
rather in Gintis’. The intention is hers, and this involves a constitutive
desire. The motivational desire on which her intention is formed, however,
is not hers.
Thus the claim that philosophical altruism is compatible with the idea
that for a complex of behaviour to be an action it has to be possible to
make sense of that behaviour in terms of the agent’s own pro-attitudes
rests on the distinction between two readings of this Davidsonian claim.
The weaker reading, which I recommend, and which does not entail
philosophical egoism, is what I propose to call intentional autonomy.
Intentional autonomy requires that under normal circumstances (barring
reflex behaviour and similar cases) an individual’s behaviour instantiates
5 It should be noted that a constitutive reading of the relation between intention and desire
requires a wide conception of desire. If desire is understood in the narrow sense of a mental
state with a content the thought of which induces some positive affective reaction (Schueler
1995), it seems that nobody would ever intend to keep their annual dentist’s appointment.
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his or her own action. This excludes intentional zombie-ism. In order to
endorse this claim, we need not, however, accept the stronger reading
that is usually given to the Davidsonian principle, which amounts to
philosophical egoism and which I claim to be false. I propose to label
this reading motivational autarky. This reading claims that any motivational
explanation of an action ultimately has to bottom out in the agent’s own
desires. According to this reading, agents may take into account other
people’s desires in whatever way they like, but they act on those desires
only if and insofar as they have a desire of their own to do so, i.e. a
desire which may be other-directed but is their own in the formal sense of
Hollis’ definition of self-interest. I call this reading motivational autarky
because the image of agency it projects is somewhat similar to the view
of closed economies. The idea is that the only motivational resources on
which agents may draw are their own.
Before discussing this distinction between intentional autonomy and
motivational autarky further, a word on how this opens up space for
philosophically altruistic action is in order. If action conceptually requires
only intentional autonomy, then there is nothing paradoxical about the
notion of philosophically altruistic action. Philosophical altruists are
agents in their own right, and not just something like the extended
bodies of their beneficiaries, insofar as the intention on which they act
is theirs. However, the motivational explanation of their action does not
bottom out in any of their own wishes, but rather in their benefactor’s.
Philosophical altruists are intentionally autonomous, but motivationally
non-autarkical. Philosophical altruists are agents whose intentions are
formed by deliberative processes not limited to their own psychological
states. Such agents sometimes treat other people’s desires in the exact
same way they do their own, considering them potential reasons to form
an intention.
5. EMPATHY AND IDENTIFICATION
This solution to the paradox of philosophical altruism raises new
questions. How can another person’s desire or intention become the
reason for a philosophical altruist’s intention if she has no conforming
desire of her own? Part of what makes this process so ‘mysterious’
(Schopenhauer’s word) lies in how desires are usually conceived of. Some
philosophers take desires to be mere behavioural dispositions. This has
the disadvantage of making it difficult to accommodate cases in which
motivation and action seem to come apart (where agents fail to act on
what they themselves take to be their strongest desire, a phenomenon that
seems to be rather widespread in everyday life). The main alternative is
to conceive of desires in phenomenological terms; not all desires need to
be conscious, but in order for a mental state to count as a desire, it has
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in principle to be accessible to consciousness. If a desire is conscious, it
must involve some, however vague, awareness (or ‘representation’) of the
desired object or state of affairs, and it is felt as a push or pull towards
that object or state of affairs. Conceiving of desires in phenomenal rather
than dispositional terms makes philosophical egoism plausible in a way
philosophical altruism is not. In the first case, it seems clear how the
desire’s motivational push brings the agent to form an intention: it is he
who has the desire after all. In the case of the philosophical altruist, things
seem different: the motivational push is an event in another person’s
psychology which is not even directly observable and accessible to the
conscious experience of another person. The motivating desire and the
action-guiding intention are events in different monads, to use Edmund
Husserl’s term, making it entirely unclear how the first event could ever
motivate the second. How could anyone ever be directly moved by a desire
she or he does not have?
It has been pointed out repeatedly in the history of philosophy that
there is something deeply wrong about this whole way of conceiving of
practical reason, and a closer look quickly reveals that the issue is not
only the way in which this makes philosophical altruism implausible,
but philosophical egoism as well. Kantians have never ceased pointing
out that the idea that our own desires enter our deliberative processes
as reasons is anything but unproblematic; in fact, for them it is doubtful
whether any of one’s desires could ever be, in itself, a reason for action.
How could a desire acquire the status of a reason for an agent? Citing
one’s desire to have one’s desires fulfilled does not help because it sets
off a potentially infinite regress, and it is at odds with Harry Frankfurt’s
(1971) observation that, in many cases, we act intentionally on desires
which are in conflict with second-order desires. Be that as it may, it should
be remarked that the question of how our own desires move us to form
intentions might not be quite as unproblematic as the received view has
it.
Conversely, the fact that other people’s pro-attitudes may function as
ultimate motivating reasons in a person’s deliberative processes might
not be quite as mysterious as it might seem. In the received literature –
most famously in Husserl’s phenomenology – the relatively recent term
empathy has been used to point out how this may come about. As far as
we empathize with other people, we are aware of and affected by their
pro-attitudes. At this point, it might be useful to remind the reader of
the fundamental insight of the philosopher who turned empathy (a term
developed in German nineteenth century aesthetics) into a psychological
concept. Empathy, Theodor Lipps (1903) claims, is a form of perception;
but contrary to what Max Scheler (1913/1979) later claimed, it isn’t,
according to Lipps, conatively neutral. Scheler argued that the fact that
one person empathizes with another does not, in itself, say anything
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about his practical attitudes; a sadist may empathize with a person whose
suffering he enjoys and be motivated to increase that suffering, while
a sympathetic person will rather be moved to alleviate the pain. Lipps,
by contrast, argues that there is something like a sympathetic impulse
involved in empathy, and that this is basic for our understanding of other
people’s minds (a claim that fits seamlessly with Michael Tomasello’s
(1998) view that toddlers grasp other people’s intentions long before
they have a theory of mind). Empathy is, according to Lipps, ‘internal
co-action’, a claim which is very much in line with current simulation
theory and the role of mirror neurons. This is, of course, not to deny that
Schelerian ‘antipathetic empathy’ is possible; but the fact of the matter is
that the two cases of sympathetic and antipathetic empathy are not on a
par; while there needs to be some antipathy at work in the unsympathetic
cases (such as the desire to see the other person suffering), no additional
pro-attitude beyond the mere fact of empathy is necessary to explain the
sympathetic effect. Consider the case of an elderly person struggling to lift
her suitcase onto the luggage rack. There is an immediate impulse to lend
her a hand, and current neurological research seems to suggest that it is
in the light of this impulse that our understanding of what she is trying to
do comes about.
This is not to deny that this impulse cannot be suppressed and that
agents can acquire a disposition to remain passive in such situations.
In fact, suppressing one’s sympathetic impulses is an important part
of the process of socialization. This is due to the fact that, while the
first interactions in which a child engages are cooperative in nature
(mother–child interaction), competitive interactions become prevalent in
later stages of a person’s life. While the empathic impulse provides
the motivational steam for success in cooperation, one must be able to
suppress that impulse – i.e. to take one’s mirror neurons entirely offline, as
it were – in competition. Successful competitive behaviour requires that an
agent be aware of his competitor’s motivations, not so as to cooperate but
rather so as to use this information to further his own anti-pathic agenda.
Moreover, and more interestingly, even some civilized cooperative
forms of interaction require the agent to suppress her empathic impulses,
a point of special importance in that it helps to dispel the view that
everyday altruism might be purely norm-driven. It is true that in most
cases (such as the cases of everyday altruism quoted above) action on
emphatic impulses is supported by the rules of politeness and proper
conduct, which may lead some into thinking that the phenomenon
in question is really a matter of manners rather than motivation.
Interestingly, however, there are many cases where the emphatic impulse
is in conflict with the norms of proper conduct. This is especially true in
areas where a person’s autonomy is at stake, and especially also respect
for her agency, whether because of the person’s handicaps or because she
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is a child and needs to be given the opportunity to exercise her own agency
without being interfered with. Generally speaking, this is true wherever
it is not only important that people’s goals are achieved, but also that
they achieve their goals themselves, without outside interference. A person
who cannot suppress her empathic impulse would be a rather bad parent,
giving her child no room to develop a sense of his own agency. And as
a perhaps even more obvious example, politeness strictly requires of us
to suppress the impulse to finish a sentence in which a person struggling
with stuttering is stuck. In many cases, the empathic impulse is supported
by social norms of propriety; in other cases, it clearly is not.
Thus the ability to suppress one’s empathic impulses is an important
part of the process of socialization, both with respect to competitive
success and conformity with the social norms of propriety. To the degree
that such a disposition is acquired, empathy becomes conatively neutral,
and such agents may need an extra pro-attitude to become active (such as
the desire to be polite, or some other self- or other-directed motive). But
this structure of conatively neutral empathy should not be mistaken for
the basic mode.
The empathic impulse is the most fundamental form of philosophical
altruism. It is not, however, commonplace to be pushed to act by
motivational impulses, be it one’s own urges or what one perceives to be
some other person’s goal (remember the Kantians’ worries). In standard
cases of action, the agent is not entirely passive with regard to his or her
motivational base. Standard action is deliberative; the role of deliberation
is to identify one’s reasons for action by making them effective (e.g. Searle
2001). One might be tempted to see deliberation as a process by which
empathic impulses are ruled out as proper reasons for action, and by
which motivational autarky is achieved. After all, how could the fact that
another person wants to A be a reason for a deliberatively rational, non-
impulsive person, without that other person’s desire having some value
in the light of the agent’s own pro-attitudes? The standard view seems
to be that for such agents empathy has to be conatively inert; empathy
informs such agents of other people’s motivations, but does not, in itself,
provide them with a reason to act – or so it seems. Without launching into
a conceptual analysis of empathy here, it seems, however, that empathy
plays the exact same structural role in practical deliberation with regard
to other people’s pro-attitudes as the agent’s self-awareness does with
regard to his own desires. Given this analogy of the agent’s awareness
of her own desires and her empathetic awareness of other people’s it is
not at all obvious, why the agent’s own desires should play a structurally
different role in her practical deliberation than those of another person. In
other words, that a person should consider another person’s desire as a
reason for action is no more mysterious than that she should treat any of
her own desires in that way.
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Another term that is sometimes used in the literature to describe this
structure is interpersonal identification (which Sigmund Freud (1921/2005)
classifies as the most fundamental mode of affective attachment between
persons). There is an air of paradox about this term since to identify x with
y is to judge that x is y, which is at odds with the claim that identification
may be interpersonal rather than intrapersonal. We seem to be coming
dangerously close to Schopenhauer’s claim about the ultimate unity of all
persons here; but we need not go that far. Suffice to say that person A
identifies with person B to the degree that B’s pro-attitudes are included
in A’s class of possible reasons for action. Contrary to what Schopenhauer
seems to think, the fact that the classes of reasons for action may overlap
(or even be one and the same, where identification is total) does mean that,
on some deeper metaphysical level, a distinction between persons does
not exist. The identification is between different people, and yet they do
not take their own motivational states to be the only ultimate reasons for
action, but rather extend the class of potential reasons for action beyond
their own psychology.
In real cases, identification is selective – a person identifies herself
with some people, but not with others – and it is a matter of degree:
a person may include some of the other’s desires in the class of her
possible reasons for action while excluding others, and she may do so
to a greater or lesser degree. Thus the question is: how is the range
of people with whom an agent identifies, and the degree to which she
does so, determined? It seems to me that the term ‘empathy’ as well as
Freud’s claim that the kind of interpersonal relation that is established
in identification is affective points toward the right answer. Empathy and
identification are affective attitudes, and it would be interesting to examine
other-directed emotions in terms of how exactly they lead those having
them to include the motivational and conative states of the others to
whom they are directed in the base of their own practical deliberation.
It is likely that such attitudes as trust and respect fulfil this role differently
from friendship or love. In this view, such emotions should not be seen as
motivational states in themselves; rather, they should be seen as modes of
identification, i.e. ways in which an agent’s class of possible motivating
reasons for action is extended beyond her own subjective motivational
set. The question of whose motivations provide an agent with reasons
for action, and to what degree they do so, is basically a matter of the
affective attitude an agent has towards other persons. In concluding this
part of the discussion, it might be worth mentioning that this reading fits
rather nicely with Auguste Comte’s original idea concerning the nature
of altruism. According to Comte, altruism should be neither viewed as a
way of thinking, nor as a way of acting. Rather, Comte situates altruism in
the third of the domains he distinguishes, i.e. the sphere of sentiments, the
affective sphere (Comte 1851: 694ff).
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6. PHILOSOPHICAL EGOISM AS A VALUE
How is the case where an agent forms an intention on the basis of
another person’s desire, simply because she is identified with that person,
different from the case where she makes the other person’s goals her
own? Having made another person’s goal, or desire, one’s own means
having a motivating other-directed desire to fulfil the other person’s wish.
This means being able to account for the degree to which other people’s
desires influence one’s course of action in terms of one’s own motivational
agenda. Using the terms introduced above, a person who does not let
herself be influenced by what other people want, apart from making other
people’s desires her own, is motivationally autarkical. If she complies with
another person’s demands, or lends another person a hand, or gives in to
some empathetic impulse, she does so only if and to the extent that this is
what she wants, in the motivational sense of the term. She draws entirely
from her own motivational resources. Acting on other-directed motivating
desires might presuppose some degree of identification; however, it is more
than that. There is a sense in which such a person volitionally endorses the
other person’s attitude that goes beyond mere identification. Identification
does not just happen to her; rather, she wants it, she is motivated to be
so identified. When she is moved to act, she does so not only because of
another person’s desire, but because this is what her own desires demand.
Such a person is fully self-reliant, and motivationally autarkical. Even
while acting with devotion in the interest of others, with no goal other
than to promote their well-being, the Nietzschean ‘I will’ is written in
capital letters over her actions. There is a sense in which motivational
autarky captures our sense of what it means to be a fully developed
person. Such a person should not do anything for the simple ultimate
reason that this is what another person (with whom she identifies herself)
wants; rather, she should do so only insofar as this is what she herself
wants. To be a fully developed person requires a sort of responsibility, i.e.
an ability to account for one’s actions in terms of one’s own motivations.
Only such a person has the ‘motive principle’, of which Aristotle speaks
in his reflections on action, fully within herself. Never would she have to
resort to external factors in basic motivational explanations of her actions.
In the last resort, she is bound by her own will only.6
6 It would be interesting to see if philosophical egoism might be at the heart of what seems
attractive in Max Stirner’s normative ideal, presented in The Ego and His Own (1845/1995),
especially since the label ‘philosophical egoism’ is often associated with his views. Stirner’s
work, as well as his critics’, is notoriously vague with regard to the distinction between
psychological and philosophical egoism, making it difficult to ascertain what Stirner’s
position really amounts to. In some passages, he seems to reject philosophical egoism as
a structural feature of action. This is especially obvious where he speaks of people’s being
‘possessed’ by motives of which they are not the owners, or a will which is not their own,
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Philosophical egoism is certainly a cultural ideal, and it is closely
intertwined with some of the thickest notions of our moral vocabulary,
such as personhood, autonomy, and responsibility. But people very often
act on other people’s desires without having set up a motivational
agenda of their own, simply because they find themselves trusting, loving,
respecting other people, perhaps even against their will, or because they
find their reasons for action permeable to other people’s desires in some
other way. Such people may fall short of our full-fledged notion of
personal identity, but even if we disapprove of such behaviour (there
seem to be opposing views),7 there is no reason to ignore its existence.
In received theory, there is a tendency to mistake philosophical egoism
for a structural feature of agency rather than taking it for what it really
is: a cultural ideal of personal development. This is particularly obvious
in intentionalistic readings of rational choice theory, where individuals
are taken to be motivationally autarkical beings. I have argued in this
paper that this is mistaken. Most people are not full-fledged philosophical
egoists, and hardly anyone has always been one.
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